Domestic resources, governance, global links, and the economic performance of Sub-Saharan Africa by Amavilah, Voxi Heinrich
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Domestic resources, governance, global
links, and the economic performance of
Sub-Saharan Africa
Voxi Heinrich Amavilah
18. October 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11193/
MPRA Paper No. 11193, posted 21. October 2008 10:33 UTC
(((((REEPS))))         Resource and Engineering Economics Publications Services
The Knowledge Peddlers under Scarcity
___________________________________________
REEPS WORKING PAPER No. 200808 (Main 1.03)
Domestic resources, governance, global links, and the economic performance of
Sub-Saharan Africa
Voxi Heinrich Amavilah
Abstract: This paper uses a simple production function to show that the economic performance of a group
of African countries in 2007 depended on three broad sources: domestic resources, governance, and global
links. The results reveal that investment plays the most important part. The effects of education
(knowledge) as a component of human capital is modest, while the health (life expectancy) part of human
capital is negative. At the aggregate level external relations, measured as openness, are positively correlated
with per capita income. However, disaggregated as integration, aid dependency, and net tourism, all three
global links have a negative effect on performance. Also, two indicators of institutional quality
(governance) show that average improvement in the quality of institutions has helped economic
performance. Considering different dimensions of institutions, the rule of law, and safety and security of
property rights are the most constraining aspects of institutions in this group of countries. The findings
leave enough room technical for fine-tuning and sophisticated estimators, which cautions interpretation.
However, it seems clear that developing countries do better improving domestic resources and institutions
than relying for performance on external relations, even though such links cannot be dismissed lightly.
JEL Classification: O55, O43, F35, O47, 
Keywords: resources, factors and forces of production, governance, institutional quality, perfomance
Afican countries
________________________________________________________________________
c/o Voxi Heinrich Amavilah, Ph.D.  PO Box 38061  Phoenix  AZ 85069-8061  USA
Phone: (602) 505-3855  Email: vhsamavilah@gmail.com  Google Keyword: amavilah
REEPS papers are all copyrighted works-in-progress. They are available for personal, not commercial, purposes. Due
credit is expected; however, permission to use REEPS materials does not give any warranty, express or implied or make
any claim that the contents will be complete, accurate or up to date. Users cannot hope to transfer any liability to REEPS
or its authors whatsoever and howsoever.
21. Introduction
In recent years African countries have fared well relative to their performance history.
Continent-wide only the HIV/AIDS problem represents a unique and present danger.
Individually, even traditional laggards, corruption-laden and coup-prone nations have
done well on the economic front - no major starvations, for example. This performance
has prompted Jorge Arbache. Delfin Go, and John Page (2008) to ask whether “Africa’s
economy is at a turning point.” What explains the recent performance, and how can it be
made to stick? This paper explores such a question. It estimates and comments on the
effects on economic performance of key domestic resources, governance as a measure of
institutional quality, and international relations (global links) across a number of Sub-
Saharan African countries in 2000, 2002, and 2007. The exercise is important for
understanding the relative significance of the sources of growth for a region that has until
recently suffered one misfortune upon another. The inspiration is the beautiful structure
of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI)  reports which, intended or
not, suggest that economic performance of any country depends on its people, its
environment (broadly defined), its economy (narrowly defined), its current technological
and market states, and its international relations. See any WDI copy. From this
inspiration the analysis relies on simple the rules of inference of a conventional
production function. Despite their simplicity, the transformations are powerful enough
for the purpose at hand.1 
Here is how the exercise proceeds. Section 2 scans the literature in search of the
theoretical foundations of the estimations. Section 3 states the analytical framework,
while Section 4 describes the estimations themselves. The results and their implications
come in Section 5, followed by the conclusion in Section 6.
2. Sources of recent economic performance of Sub-Saharan Africa
I suggest that the recent economic growth performance of Sub-Saharan African countries
came from three broad sources: (a) domestic resources (factors and forces of production),
(b) governance (a measure of institutional quality), and ( c) global links (a measure of
openness to external contacts). In what follows I outline the literature that connects each
source to economic performance.
2.1 Economic performance and domestic resources
• Economic performance and primary factors of production
The vast literature on the primary sources of economic performance is now well
understood. Pre-independence, growth whatever there occurred in Sub-Saharan African
countries, was an extensive type of growth deriving from the growth of labor, land
(mainly mineral and agricultural commodities), and fixed capital in agriculture, and
mining and quarrying (see Fafchamps, 2000, Amavilah, 1996).
3Tahari, Ghura, Akitoby, and Aka (2004) find that for Sub-Saharan African countries
growth during the 1960-2002 years depended on the accumulation of “objects” rather
than “ideas”- to use Paul Romer’s lingo. Over the same time period only Botswana,
Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, and Mauritius grew at rates exceeding four per cent per
annum (Basu, Calamitsis, Ghura, 2000, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001a).
Overall capital accumulation contributed to growth more than labor, although Amavilah
(1996, 1998) suspects double-counting as a result of recording improvements in mining,
for example, as additions to both primary sector and secondary sector capital. Beginning
c. 1997 the number of African countries with growth rates above four per cent more than
doubled. What explains this turnaround of things?
• Economic performance and secondary or higher resources
Secondary or higher resources mean fluid capital and human capital. Accordging to
Lester Taylor (2000), and Amavilah and Newcomb (2004), fluid capital is cumulative net
investment plus allowable depreciation. The first is subject to the capacity to invest set by
the financial system, and the second is conditional on in-situ capacity to produce. There
is little empirical study on this subject in general, least of all in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Regarding human capital, Tahari, Ghura, Akitoby, and Aka (2004) argue that the recent
growth is due to improved institutional quality, improved human capital, improved
macroeconomic policy environment, and the broadening of the export base from a
narrow range of commodities to semi-processed goods. Amavilah (2007) presents
evidence supporting the positive effects of macroeconomic policy on the performance of
46 African countries in 2004. Moreover, O’Connell and Ndulu (2000), and Ndula and
O’Connell (1999) associate the performance of Sub-Saharan African countries with
capital accumulation, demographic changes, policy, institutions, political (in)stabiliy, and
total factor productivity (TFP), where TFP is measured as the number of years of
schooling. In that sense TFP is the same thing as human capital (H). Drawing on Barro
and Lee (1996, 2000) base dataset for the value of human capital in economic
performance, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) show that most African countries lack the
critical mass of H stock required for fast-growing TFP. 
• Economic performance and forces of production
From both W. Arthur Lewis (1965) and Paul Romer (1990, 1993, 1994) it is clear that
economic performance depends on factors and forces. A number of forces underscore
Africa’s growth and decline. Key among them are technology and institutions, where
technology is measured variously as TFP and/or Solow residual (A), and institutions,
often proxied by governance. In a recent paper Jean-Claude Maswana (2006) associates
poor performance of African countries with lack of technological innovation and its
underlying knowledge, and bad policies. The significance of institutions for economic
performance has never been an issue for debate. The controversy has been over how to
quantify the role of institutions.
42.2 Economic performance and governance
The extant literature shows that conventional factors and forces of production are
necessary, but not enough to explain economic performance. Increasing evidence points
to institutions and institutional quality as essential elements in the growth of both output
and resources themselves. This is, however, not new evidence as classical economists
like Adam Smith (1973 [1776]), and new classical economists like W. Arthur Lewis
(1965), and contemporary theorists like North (1990), and Gradstein and Konrad (2006),
to mention a few randomly, all touch on the role in economic performance of institutions
and institutional quality. Aron (2000) provides an excellent review of the links between
institutions and the economic performance of developing countries (see Table 1, pp. 108
- 113). From the review it is clear that countries with “good” institutions tend to do better
than countries without or with “bad” institutions. What remains controversial is how to
quantify the effects of institutions, but even that concern is waning, given what we now
know from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001b, 2002)2, Nunn (2008, 2005. 2004),
Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), Amavilah (2006), and many others. In fact, some experts,
like Sachs and Warner (1997), and Bloom and Sachs (1998) use geography to describe
institutional effects on growth. Others turn to proxies like constitutions, political
freedoms and social justice. In the past African countries have not done well by such
measures. 
Among other measures of institutional quality, governance has been the preferred
indicator. For this reason experts in the area collect, rationalize, and update data for what
now is called the Kaufman, Kraay, Zoido- and Mastrzzi (KKZM) index of governance
(Kaufman and Kraay, 2008). Quibria (2006, p. 104), for example, shows that the KKZM
composite correlates positively to the economic growth of a number of Asian countries.
Of the 18 or so common indices of governance, the World Bank’s Worldwide
Gover nance  I nd ica t o rs (WGI)  is  t he most  comprehensive (see
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/). It covers 212 countries and territories over 1996-
2006, and it has six dimensions: (a) voice and accountability, (b) political stability and
absence of violence, ( c) government and effectiveness, (d) regulatory quality, (e) rule of
law, and (f) control of corruption. All six dimensions, individually and collectively, can
make a statement about economic performance. For instance, where the rule of law is
absent or weak, property rights will be fragile,  markets dysfunctional, and economic
performance most likely unsustainable.
In October 2006, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation at  Harvard University’s Kennedy School
of Government released its own Mo Ibrahim African governance index (MIGI). Based on
2005 data, MIGI expands on a similar series for 2000 and 2002, and covers 48 countries.
The compillers and financier of the MIGI claim that it is geographically more
comprehensive than similar indices, and addresses biases that afflicted competing
indicators like the WGI. (http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/index/).
52.3 Economic performance and global links
Countries no longer operate in isolation no matter their size and economic conditions.
External relations play a role in the performance of nations, and the debate about the
merits and demerits of globalization centers around this issue. For instance, research
shows a strong correlation between foreign trade and economic growth (see Frankel and
Romer, 1999). There are doubtful questions about the effects of foreign assistance on
economic performance of developing countries, with some putting it down and others
advocating “aid for trade”. However, the factor that these countries want aid increased
suggests that aid is important at least for some countries. And there are pertinent issues of
international finance, especially debt and debt servicing. There is thus a need for
economic models to allow for global links.
3. Analytical framework
The value of the ith country’s economic activity, such as its gross domestic product (Yi)
depends on the country’s technical capability (Xi), i.e.,
Moreover, technical capability has two broad dimensions: domestic (Xi,d) and global (Xi,f)
links, that is,  Domestic production in which global links are, respectively,
absent and exogenously present would be (2a) and (2b) below:
where in (2a)  in (2b)  i indicates the ith country, d is for domestic, and f is
for foreign links.
3.1. Economic performance and domestic resources (Xi,d)
Underlying domestic production relations are current and historical factors and forces of
production. Current factors include land ( R), economically-active population (N), and
physical capital (K). Historical factors include the initial conditions of production in each
country, normally measured by the level of income in some reference (initial) year (Y0).
The assumption is that Y0 depends on historical legacies like colonial background
(religion, language, political system, and such). For now restate (1) as
(1)
(2)
6Without loss of generality, I simplify (3) by noting that the supply of land as a primary
factor of production is limited, so that it can be set equal to unity, and as in previous
studies its effects on economic activity are sufficiently picked up by variables such as
trade openness, distance from the Equator, landlockedness, and so on3. If (3) is
multiplicative in forma, then
where N consists of unskilled labor (L) and skilled labor defined as human capital (H).
Suppose  Following Solow (1957), I also assume that L
evolves at an exogenous rate (n) equal to the rate of growth of N, i.e.,
Given (5), (4) becomes
In per capita and natural logarithmic terms (6) is
where y = log(Y/N), k = log(K/N), h = log (H/N), a = productivity shifter, " = elasticity
of capital, $1 = elasticity of raw labor, and $2 = elasticity of H, and n = natural rate of
growth of N over time t.
Jones (1997), and Hall and Jones (1999) approximate H as the proportion of raw labor
(L) that is skilled, where skills are gained through education, for example, so that
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
7where S = educational attainment measured as the number of years of schooling.
However, Amavilah (2008) argues that (8) understates the level of H and overstates its
statistical importance. Hence, the correct evolution of H is over the economically-active
population (N), i.e.,
This means that (9) is consistent with Romer (1989, 1990), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994),
and Dinopoulos (1996).  It suggests that H is quality N á lá Schultz (1981), Becker
(1996), and others. The refining of N takes place through processes and activities like
education, training, experience, health, nutrition, and mortality-fertility. Hence, in (9) q is
a vector of processes and activities that refine N, and n is the constant growth rate of L
equal to the growth rate of N, according to the exogenous neoclassical growth model.
Going back to (6), plugging in H, and simplifying results in
Normalizing (10)
In (6) or (7) and (10) or (11) the state of technology is the only domestic force. It( , )A a
is assumed to be nonstochastic and independent of L and H both contemporaneously and
over time. Obviously, in developing countries ( ) is likely associated with K. InA a,
addition, there are nontrivial relationships among A, H, and L, but I assume that (7)
expresses the ith country’s economic activity on the bases of primary domestic resources
(factors and forces). The effects of these resources depend on the quality of surrounding
institutions.
3.3. Economic performance, domestic resources, and governance (I)
As Section 2 above indicates there are many measures of governance, but only the World
Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI), and the Mo Ibrahim’s governance index
(MIGI) interest this paper. Obviously, different aspects of institution affect economic
(9)
(10)
(11)
8performance differently. Here I argue that the primary influence on production of
institutions and institutional quality takes place through improving the quality of the
population - “mining population for human capital” (Amavilah, 2008a).4 In this way it is
easy to see measures of governance as elements of q, so that, assuming  Iq S IT = ( , ),
express  (10) as
where S and I are educational attainment and governance, respectively. Now,  if I let
 then normalizing and logging both sides of
(12) gives
3.4. Economic performance, domestic resources, governance, and global links (Xi,f)
Eqs.(8) and (13) express the ith country’s economic activity in terms of primary domestic
resources (factors and forces) and surrounding institutions. However, next I add the fact
that African countries no longer operate in isolation from the rest of the world. What are
the impacts of global links on these countries, and how do they compare to those of
domestic resources and institutions? To explore this question I identify and introduce into
(12) and (13) key aspects of international relations such that
Then, I consider four global links. First, is a measure of the extent to which the ith
country is integrated into the global economy (Inter). The measure is calculated by WDI
as the difference between the rates of growth of exports and GDP. Second, aid
dependency (Aid), a percent of foreign aid in gross national income. Finally, I link
production of GDP to net international tourism (Tour), a percent of exports of tourism
less imports of tourism.
Normalizing (14) and taking the natural logarithms on both sides leads to
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
9where  where appropriate.5 The task now turns to how to estimate (15).
4. Estimations
Data on some variables of interest such as MIGI are available only for 2000, 2002, and
2007.  In the name of consistency that means that all estimations cover only these three
years across 38 African countries.
4.1 Data
In a companion paper (governdata available at 
h t t p : / / i d e a s . r e p e c . o r g / e / p a m 8 . h t m l ,  h t t p : / / m p r a . u b . u n i -
m u e n c h e n . d e / v i e w / p e o p l e / A m a v i l a h , _ V o x i _ H e i n r i c h . h t m l ,  a n d
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=347624), I describe the data
in detail. Here it suffices to say the dependent variable (y) is per capita GDP, drawn from
the PWT 6.2 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2006). Key independent variables include per
capita physical capital (k), represented by the percent of GDP that goes to fixed capital
formation as listed in IMF’s IFS (2007). The same data is available from the PWT 6.2,
but it has gaps for some countries.  Besides k there is H. However, the Mincerian
approach measures of (H as the improved labor force, with the process of improvement
taking place mainly through education, but sometimes also via on-the-job training,
health, and job seniority. This approach underestimates the level of H and overstates its
importance (see Amavilah, 2008). Here I argue that H is the quality of the economically-
active population net of raw labor. It has two interactive components. The first
component relates to the educational process and is normally proxied as years of
schooling (S). But educational attainment is so much higher the better the quality of
surrounding institutions. Hence,  where in some estimations  and in
others
WGI and MIGI have different dimensions listed in Table 1. Some dimensions are
predictably (expected a priori to be) inversely signed; others are not as clear. This
expectation is consistent with the “law of motion” by which H is built through education
and depreciated by age ( see Cohen, 1996, p. 355). The only difference, and not a trivial
one, is that technological progress slows the rate of H depreciation.
Since y is per capita GDP, and we really do not need data for either L or N. Instead, we
can use the rate of population growth (n) with a coefficient , or a time dummyβ1t
variable (t) with a coefficient . Also, the data for the Xf, consisting of three variablesβ1n
Inter, Aid, and Tour, comes from WDI reports. In this case, as in all other appropriate
cases, the data are real, rather than nominal.
10
1In reading the documentation of this index I notice that the authors use “human development” and
“economic development” interchangeably.  I take the definition for granted.
Table 1 - Dimensions of governance
World governance indicators (WGI)
! Voice and accountability
! Political stability and absence of violence
! Government effectiveness
! Regulatory quality
! Rule of law
! Control of corruption
Mo Ibrahim’s governance index (MIGI)
! Safety and security
! Rule of law, transparency, and corruption
! Participation and human rights
! Sustainable economic opportunity
! Human development1
11
4.2 Specification and Method
I assume the equations to be estimated are linear, at least in the parameters, so that the
general specification is,
In addition, I assume normal error and apply the OLS estimator is the estimation method.
In doing so I further assume there is little autocorrelation, and no variable interactions.
This is obviously a shortcoming, but one that is not addressed in this paper, although ad
hoc adjustments are made to address conventional econometric problems.
4.3 Procedure
The estimation proceeds in three interrelated steps. First, I consider the following three
relations:
Second, I estimate
As a final step I turn to
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
12
 5. Results
The tables that follow present estimated results. Tables 2 and 3 display unsanitized
results. Although econometrically impure, my opinion is that unsanitized results are the
real results; they stand a better chance for policy relevance than sanitized results, in Table
4. While bleaching the results meets the requirement of good econometrics, it also kills,
figuratively speaking, all the germs, including the good germs. In this case opportunity
costs are truly ubiquitous.
5.1. Real (unsanitized) results
If one assumes that performance depends on domestic resources (Xd) alone, it is clear
that investment (k) and human capital (H) in its Education and Health components are
key factors. These three variables explain up to 38% of the variations in per capita GDP,
with the impact of k being the largest and of Health the second largest.
Assume that real GDP depends on the quality of institutions alone. Using WGI measures
of governance reveals that a percentage improvement in the average quality of
institutions contributes half a dollar to real GDP per capita, which explains 24% of
variations in the relationship, and leaving a large “measure of our ignorance”, as
Abramovitz (1986) would put it. Similarly, utilizing MIGIave a unit improvement in
governance has an impact of 1.7 on y. However, the explanatory power as the Buse-R-
square shows is comparable. Thus, the impacts of WGIave and MIGIave are larger than
those of Xd.
If we disaggregate governance into its six WGI dimensions, the Buse R-square increases
significantly to 62%. Measures against corruption contribute positively, but in a
statistically insignificant way, to real GDP. The rule of law and freedom of expression
constrain the growth of GDP. By the MIGI, the effects of human rights and economic
development are positive, though statistically insignificant. Property rights are not safe
and secure.
If one lets these countries interact with the outside world, and measure the extent of
interaction with the PWT 6.2 indicator of Openness, openness is statistically significant
to per capita GDP. However, disaggregating openness and representing global links by
the extent of integration (Inter), aid-dependency (Aid), and net tourism (Tour), openness
is a major constraint on y. Specifically, this group of countries is not sufficiently
integrated in the global economy to benefit from it. The countries are also too dependent
on aid, while tourism is too narrow. This makes sense since tourism is really factor land
in the classical sense, and as such subject to diminishing returns. In fact these variable
explain little as the residual is well above the mean of the dependent variable, suggesting
some other variables are missing.
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Regressions in which y depends on investment, education, life expectancy, PWT 6.2
openness, and various WGI indicators of institutional quality, finds the rule of law,
freedom of expression, health, and corruption too constraining, the first three in a
significant manner. MIGI measures of institutional quality produce similar results.
Overall, for both MIGI and WGI,  health, rule of law, and freedom of expression are the
main obstacles to economic performance of this group of countries.
5.2. Bleached (sanitized) results
Table 4 documents some results sanitized against basic econometric problems by ad hoc
adjustments like dropping variables whose effects are insignificant. Comparing these
results to those in Tables 2 and 3 one notices considerable improvement in the statistical
strength of the parameters. Across all models gross domestic investment has the largest
positive effect. On average openness favors income generation in this group of countries.
However, when disaggregated into the extent of integration into the global economy,
dependency on foreign aid, and tourism, the results are negative.
Also across countries WGI measures of institutional quality are very significant with
government effectiveness being strongest followed by the rule of law, but of opposite
sign. The explanatory power increases to 64%. This statistic is 70% for the MIGI
variable, but here it is education, safety and security, and development which are
limiting. 
6. Conclusion 
In recent years African countries have performed well (Ruffing, 2008). How are we to
understand that performance? This paper suggests that to understand what is happening
one must see that economic performance depends on domestic resources, global links,
and institutional quality. The results of the analysis reveal that gross investment has had
the most consistent positive effect on the real incomes of these countries. This support
the conclusion reached by S. Devarajan, W. Easterly, and H. Pack (2002) that “low
investment is not the constraint on African development.” The education component of
human capital is generally important, but only after the threshold of 10 or more years of
schooling. This may well be suggestive of Hanushek and Woessmann’s (2008) study that
shows that what matters for development is not the quantitative, but the qualitative
aspects of education (cognitive skills); test scores contribute more to the GDP growth
than years of schooling and openness (see their p. 639).
The results also shows that while openness in general is a good thing, openness to fierce
competition through global integration and aid-dependency harms the performance of
this group of countries. Almost all countries in the group have a surplus tourism export
account. On average, however, the effects are negative, which contradicts Fayissa, Nsiah,
and Tadasse (2007), although their sample size was larger.
24
Improvements in the average quality of institutions, as measured by both the WGI and
MIGI, have meant high real GDPPC. At the disaggregate level the results show that the
rule of law and freedom of expression under the WGI institutional regime, and safety and
security, and human development under the MIGI regime, have constrained real GDPPC.
I recognize two weaknesses of the results of this paper: variable interactions were
assumed away, and  limited degrees of freedom were ignored. Even with that
shortcoming, the implications for policy and further research are clear..  
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